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Abstract
Although neural networks could achieve state-of-the-art
performance while recongnizing images, they often suf-
fer a tremendous defeat from adversarial examples–inputs
generated by utilizing imperceptible but intentional per-
turbation to clean samples from the datasets. How to de-
fense against adversarial examples is an important prob-
lem which is well worth researching. So far, very few
methods have provided a significant defense to adversar-
ial examples. In this paper, a novel idea is proposed and an
effective framework based Generative Adversarial Nets
named APE-GAN is implemented to defense against the
adversarial examples. The experimental results on three
benchmark datasets including MNIST, CIFAR10 and Im-
ageNet indicate that APE-GAN is effective to resist ad-
versarial examples generated from five attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have recently achieved excellent
performance on a variety of visual and speech recognition
tasks. However, they have non-intuitive characterisitics
and intrinsic blind spots that are easy to attack using ob-
scure manipulation of their input[6, 11, 19, 26]. In many
cases, the structure of the neural networks is strongly re-
lated to the training data distribution, which is in contra-
diction with the network’s ability to achieve high general-
ization performance.
Szegedy et al. [26] first noticed that imperceptible per-
turbation of test samples can be misclassified by neural
networks. They term this kind of subtly perturbed sam-
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Figure 1: A demonstration of APE-GAN applied to
MNIST and CIFAR10 classification networks. The im-
ages with a small perturbation named adversarial samples
cannot be correctly classified with high confidence. How-
ever, the samples processed by our model is able to be
classified correctly.
ples “adversarial examples”. In contrast to noise sam-
ples, adversarial examples are imperceptible, designed
intentionally, and more likely to cause false predictions
in the image classification domain. What is more seri-
ous is that adversarial examples transfer across models
named transferability, which can be leveraged to perform
black-box attacks[14, 19]. In other words, an adversary
can find the adversarial examples generated from substi-
tute model trained by the adversary and apply it to at-
tack the target model. Howerver, so far, transferability
is mostly appears on small datasets, such as MNIST and
CIFAR10. Transferability over large scale datasets, such
as ImageNet, has yet to be better understood. Therefore,
in this paper, black-box attacks is not taken into consider-
ation, and resisting the white-box attacks (the adversary
has complete access to the target model including the
architecture and all paramaters) is the core work of the
paper.
Adversarial examples pose potential security threats for
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practical machine learning applications. Recent research
has shown that a large fraction of adversarial examples are
classified incorrectly even when obtained from the cell-
phone camera[11]. This makes it possible that an adver-
sary crafts adversarial images of traffic signs to cause the
self-driving cars to take unwanted actions[20]. Therefore,
the research of resisting adversarial examples is very sig-
nificant and urgent.
Until now, there are two classes of approaches to de-
fend against adversarial examples. The straightforward
way is to make the model inherently more robust with
enhanced training data as show in Figure 2 or adjusted
learning strategies. Adversarial training [6, 27] or de-
fensive distillation [18, 22] belongs to this class. It is
noteworthy that the original defensive distillation is bro-
ken by Carlini and Wagner’s attack [2], however, which
can be resisted by the extending defensive distillation.
In addition, the faultiness original adversarial training re-
mains highly vulnerable to transferred adversarial exam-
ples crafted on other models which is discussed in the en-
semble adversarial training, and the model trained using
ensemble adversarial training are slightly less robust to
some white-box attacks. The second is a series of detec-
tion mechanisms used to detect and reject an adversar-
ial sample[4, 15]. Unfortunately, Carlini et al. [1] indi-
cate that adversarial examples generated from Carlini and
Wagner’s attack are significantly harder to detect than pre-
viously appreciated via bypassing ten detection methods.
Therefore, defensing against adversarial examples is still
a huge challenge.
Misclassification of the adversarial examples is mainly
due to the intentionally imperceptible perturbations to
some pixels of the input images. Thus, we propose an al-
gorithm to eliminate the adversarial perturbation of input
data to defense against the adversarial examples. The ad-
versarial perturbation elimination of the samples can be
defined as the problem of learning a manifold mapping
from adversarial examples to original examples. Gener-
ative Adversarial Net (GAN) proposed by Goodfellow et
al[5] is able to generate images similar to training set with
a random noise. Therefore, we designed an framework
utilizing GAN to generate clean examples from adver-
sarial examples. Meanwhile, SRGAN[13], the successful
application of GAN on super-resolution issues, provides
a valuable experience to the implementation of our algo-
rithm.
In this paper, an effective framework is imple-
mentated to eliminate the aggressivity of adversar-
ial examples before being recognized, as shown in
Figure 2. The code and trained models of the
framework are available on https://github.com/
shenqixiaojiang/APE-GAN, so we welcome new
attacks to break our defense.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• A new perspective of defending against adversar-
ial examples is proposed. The idea is to first elimi-
nate the adversarial perturbation using a trained net-
work and then feed the processed example to classi-
fication networks.
• An effective and reasonable framework based
on the above idea is implemented to resist adver-
sarial examples. The experimental results on three
benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness.
• The proposed framework possesses strong appli-
cability. It can tackle adversarial examples with-
out knowing what target model they are constructed
upon.
• The training procedure of the APE-GAN needs
no knowledge of the architecture and parameters
of the target model.
2 Related Work
In this section, methods of generating adversarial exam-
ples that are closely related to this work is briefly re-
viewed. In addition, GAN and its connection to our
method will be discussed.
In the remaining of the paper we use the following no-
tation and terminology:
• X - the clean image from the datasets.
• Xadv - the adversarial image.
• ytrue - the true class for the input X .
• yfool - the class label different from ytrue for the in-
put X .
• f - the classifier mapping from input image to a dis-
crete label set.
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Figure 2: (a) The traditional deep learning framework shows its robustness to clean images but is highly vulnerable
to adversarial examples. (b) Existing adversarial training framework can increase the robustness of target model
with enhanced training data. (c) We propose an adversarial perturbation elimination framework named APE-GAN to
eliminate the perturbation of the adversarial examples before feeding it into the target model to increase the robustness.
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• J(X, y) - the cost function used to train the model
given image X and class y.
•  - the size of worst-case perturbations,  is the upper
bound of the L∞ norm of the perturbation.
• ClipX,{A} - an -neighbourhood clipping of A to
the range [Xi,j − ,Xi,j + ].
• Non-targeted adversarial attack - the goal of it is to
slightly modify clean image that it will be classified
incorrectly by classifier.
• Targeted adversarial attack - the goal of it is to
slightly modify source image that it will be classi-
fied as specified target class by classifier.
2.1 Methods Generating Adversarial Ex-
amples
In this subsection, six approaches we utilized to generate
adversarial images are provided with a brief description.
2.1.1 L-BFGS Attack
Minimum distortion generation function D where
f(D(x)) 6= f(x) defined as an optimization problem can
be solved by a box-constrained L-BFGS to craft adversar-
ial perturbation under L2 distance metric [26].
The optimization problem can be formulized as:
minimize λ · ||D(x)− x||22 + J(D(x), yfool)
subject to D(x) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
The constant λ > 0 controls the trade-off between the
perturbation’s amplitude and its attack power which can
be found with line search.
2.1.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method Attack (FGSM)
Goodfellow et al.[6] proposed this method to generate ad-
versarial images under L∞ distance metric.
Given the input X the fast gradient sign method gener-
ates the adversarial images with :
Xadv = X +  · sign(5XJ(X, ytrue)) (2)
where  is chosen to controls the perturbation’s amplitude.
The Eqn.2 indicates that all pixels of the input X are
shifted simultaneously in the direction of the gradient
with a single step. This method is simpler and faster than
other methods, but lower attack success rate since at the
beginning, it was designed to be fast rather than optimal.
2.1.3 Iterative Gradient Sign
An straightforward way introduced by Kurakin et al.[11]
to extend the FGSM is to apply it several times with a
smaller step size α and the intermediate result is clipped
by the ε. Formally,
Xadv0 =X,
XadvN+1 =ClipX,{XadvN +
α · sign(5XJ(XadvN , ytrue))}
(3)
2.1.4 DeepFool Attack
DeepFool is a non-targeted attack introduced by Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al [16]. It is one of methods to apply the
minimal perturbation for misclassification under the L2
distance metric. The method performs iterative steps on
the adversarial direction of the gradient provided by a lo-
cally linear approximation of the classifier until the deci-
sion hyperplane has crossed. The objective of DeepFool
is
minimize ||D(x)− x||2
subject to argmax
ytrue
f(D(x)) 6= ytrue (4)
Although it is different from L-BFGS, the attack can
also be seen as a first-order method to craft adversarial
perturbation.
2.1.5 Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack(JSMA)
The targeted attack is also a gradient-based method which
uses the gradient to compute a saliency score for each
pixel. The saliency score reflects how strongly each pixel
can affect the resulting classification. Given the saliency
map computed by the model’s Jacobian matrix, the attack
greedily modifies the most important pixel at each itera-
tion until the prediction has changed to a target class. This
attack seeks to craft adversarial perturbation underL0 dis-
tance metric [21].
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2.1.6 Carlini and Wagner Attack(CW)
There are three attacks for the L0, L2 and L∞ distance
metric proposed by Carlini et al.[2] Here, we just give a
brief description of L2 attack. The objective of L2 attack
is
minimize ||1
2
(tanh(ω) + 1)− x||22
+ c · l(1
2
(tanh(ω) + 1)
(5)
where the loss function l is defined as
l(D(x)) = max(max{Z(D(x))i : i 6= t} − Z(D(x))t,−κ)
The Z is the logits of a given model and κ is used to
control the confidence of adversarial examples. As κ in-
creases, the more powerful adversarial examples become.
The constant c can be chosen with binary search which is
similar to λ in the L-BFGS attack.
The Carlini and Wagner’s attack is proved by the au-
thors that it is superior to other published attacks. Then,
all the three attacks should be taken into consideration to
defense against.
In addition, we use CW-L0, CW-L2, CW-L∞ to rep-
resent the attack for the L0, L2 and L∞ distance metric
respectively in the following experiments.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Nets
Generative Adversarial Net (GAN) is a framework incor-
porating an adversarial discriminator into the procedure
of training generative models. There are two models in
the GAN: a generator G that is optimized to estimate the
data distribution and a discriminator D that aims to dis-
tinguish between samples from the training data and fake
samples from G.
The objective of GAN can be formulized as a minimax
value function V (G,D):
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) =EX∼pdata(X)[logD(X)]
+ Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(6)
GAN has been known to be unstable to train, often
resulting in generators that produce nonsensical outputs
since it is difficult to maintain a balance between the G
and D.
The Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Nets
(DCGAN)[23] is a good implementation of the GAN with
convolutional networks that make them stable to train in
most settings.
Our model in this paper is implemented based on DC-
GAN owing to its stability. The details will be discussed
in the following section.
3 Our Approach
The fundamental idea of defending against adversarial ex-
amples is to eliminate or damage of the trivial perturba-
tions of the input before being recognized by the target
model.
The infinitesimal difference of adversarial image and
clean image can be formulated as:
‖Xadv −X‖ = η (7)
Ideally, the perturbations η can be got rid of from Xadv .
That means the distribution of Xadv is highly consistent
with X .
The global optimality of GAN is the consistence of the
generative distribution of G with samples from the data
generating distribution:
pg = pdata (8)
The procedure of converging to a good estimator of pdata
coincides with the demand of the elimimation of adver-
sarial perturbations η.
Based on the above analysis, a novel framework based
GAN to eliminate the adversarial perturbations is pro-
posed. We name this class of architectures defending
against adversarial examples based on GAN, adversar-
ial perturbation elimination with GAN(APE-GAN), as
shown in Figure 2.
The APE-GAN network is trained in an adversarial set-
ting. While the generator G is trained to alter the perturba-
tion with tiny changes to the input examples, the discrim-
inator D is optimized to seperate the clean examples and
reconstructed examples without adversarial perturbations
obtained from G. To achieve this, a task specified fusion
loss function is invented to make the adversarial examples
highly consistent with original clean image manifold.
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3.1 Architecture
The ultimate goal of APE-GAN is to train a generating
functionG that estimates for a given adversarial input im-
age Xadv its corresponding Xˆ counterpart. To achieve
this, a generator network parametrized by θG is trained.
Here θG denotes the weights and baises of a generate net-
work and is obtained by optimizing an adversarial pertur-
bation elimination specified loss function lape. For train-
ing images Xadvk obtained by applying FGSM with cor-
responding original clean image Xk, k = 1, ..., N , we
solve:
θˆG = argmin
θG
1
N
N∑
k=1
lape(GθG(X
adv
k ), Xk) (9)
A discriminator network DθD along with GθG is de-
fined to solve the adversarial zero sum problem:
min
θG
max
θD
EX∼pdata(X) logDθD (X)−
EXadv∼pG(Xadv) log(DθD (GθG(X
adv)))
(10)
The general idea behind this formulation is that it al-
lows one to train a generative model G with the goal of
deceiting a differentiable discriminator D that is trained
to tell apart reconstructed images G(Xadv) from original
clean images. Consequently, the generator can be trained
to produce reconstructed images that are highly similar to
original clean images, and thus D is unable to distinguish
them.
The general architecture of our generator network G is
illustrated in Figure 2. Some convolutional layers with
stride = 2 are leveraged to get feature maps with lower
resolution and followed by some deconvolutional layers
with stride = 2 to recover the original resolution.
To discriminate original clean images from recon-
structed images, we train a discriminator network. The
general architecture is illustrated in Figure 2. The dis-
criminator network is trained to solve the maximization
problem in Equation 10. It also contains some convolu-
tional layers with stride = 2 to get some high-level fea-
ture maps, two dense layers and a final sigmoid activation
function to obtain a probability for sample classification.
The specific architectures on MNIST,CIFAR10 and Im-
ageNet are introduced in the experimental setup.
3.2 Loss Function
3.2.1 Discriminator Loss
According to Equation 10, the loss function of discrimi-
nator , ld is designed easily:
ld = −
N∑
n=1
[logDθD (X) + logDθD (GθG(X
adv))] (11)
3.2.2 Generator Loss
The definition of our adversarial perturbation elimination
specified loss function lape is critical for the performance
of our generator network to produce images without ad-
versarial perturbations. We define lape as the weighted
sum of several loss functions as:
lape = ξ1lmse + ξ2ladv (12)
which consists of pixel-wise MSE(mean square error) loss
and adversarial loss.
• Content Loss: Inspired by image super-resolution
method[13], the pixel-wise MSE loss is defined as:
lmse =
1
WH
W∑
x=1
H∑
y=1
(Xx,y −GθG(Xadv)x,y)2
(13)
Adversarial perturbations can be viewed as a special
noise constructed delicately. The most widely used
loss for image denoising or super-resolution will be
able to achieve satisfactory results for adversarial
perturbation elimination.
• Adversarial Loss: To encourage our network to
produce images residing on the manifold of origi-
nal clean images, the adversarial loss of the GAN is
also employed. The adversarial loss ladv is calcu-
lated based on the probabilities of the discriminator
over all reconstructed images:
ladv =
N∑
n=1
[1− logDθD (GθG(Xadv))] (14)
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Table 1: Error rates (in %) of adversarial examples generated from five methods for target model and
APE-GAN on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Imagenet. The error rates of target models on the clean images
are reported in the experimental setup.
Attack MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet (Top-1)
Target
Model
APE-
GANm
Target
Model
APE-
GANc
Target
Model
APE-GANi
L-BFGS 93.4 2.2 92.7 19.9 93.3 42.9
FGSM 96.3 2.8 77.8 26.4 72.9 40.1
DeepFool 97.1 2.2 98.3 19.2 98.4 45.9
JSMA 97.8 38.6 94.1 38.3 98.7 45.0
CW-L0 100.0 27.0 100.0 46.9 100.0 29.4
CW-L2 100.0 1.5 100.0 30.5 99.7 26.1
CW-L∞ 100.0 1.2 100.0 32.2 100.0 27.0
4 Evaluation
The L-BFGS, DeepFool, JSMA, FGSM, CW includ-
ing CW-L0 CW-L2 CW-L∞ attacks introduced in the
related-work are resisted by APE-GAN on three stan-
dard datasets: MNIST[12], a database of handwritten
digits has 70,000 28x28 gray images in 10 classes(digit
0-9), CIFAR10[10], a dataset consists of 60,000 32x32
colour images in 10 classes, and ImageNet[3], a large-
image recognition task with 1000 classes and more than
1,000,000 images provided.
It is noteworthy that the adversarial samples cannot be
saved in the form of picture, since discretizing the values
from a real-numbered value to one of the 256 points se-
riously degrades the quality. Then it should be saved and
loaded as float32.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Input
The input samples of target model can be classified into
adversarial input obtained from attack approaches and
benign input which is taken into account by the tradi-
tional deep learning framework including clean images
and clean images added with random noise. Adding ran-
dom noise to original clean images is the common trick
used in data augmentation to improve the robustness, but
does not belong to the standard training procedures of tar-
get model. Hence, it is not shown in Figure 2.
• Adversarial Input: The FGSM and JSMA attacks
have been implemented in the cleverhans v.1 [17]
which is a Python library to benchmark machine
learning systems’ vulnerability to adversarial exam-
ples and the L-BFGS attack and DeepFool attacks
have been implemented in the Foolbox[24] which is
a Python toolbox to create adversarial examples that
fool neural networks. The code of CW attack has
been provided by Carlini et al [2]. We experiment
with  = 0.3 on MNIST,  = 0.1 on CIFAE10,
 = 8/255 on ImageNet for the FGSM attack, κ
= 0 on the three datasets for the CW-L2 attack and
default parameters of other attacks are utilised.
• Benign Input: The full test set of MNIST and CI-
FAR10 are utilized for the evaluation while results
on ImageNet use a random sample of 10,000 RGB
inputs from the test set. In addition, Gaussian white
noise of mean 0 and variance 0.05 is employed in the
following.
4.1.2 Target Models
In order to provide the most accurate and fair comparison,
whenever possible, the models provided by the authors or
libraries should be used.
• MNIST: We train a convolutional networks (denoted
A in the Appendix) for L-BFGS and DeepFool at-
tacks. For CW attack, the model is provided by Car-
lini (denoted B in the Appendix). For FGSM and
7
Table 2: Error rates (in %) of benign input for target models and APE-GAN on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Imagenet.
Here, the target models are model C, DenseNet40, InceptionV3 which are identical to the target models for FGSM
attack on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Imagenet respectively.
Input MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet (Top-1)
C APE-
GANm
DenseNet40 APE-
GANc
InceptionV3 APE-GANi
clean image 0.8 1.2 9.9 10.3 22.9 24.0
random Gaussian noise image 1.7 1.6 11.3 10.7 25.2 24.5
Table 3: Error rates (in %) of adversarial exmamples gen-
erated from FGSM with different  for target models,
APE-GAN on MNIST and CIFAR10. The error rates of
target models on the clean images are reported in the ex-
perimental setup. Here, the target models are model C,
DenseNet40 which are identical to the target models for
FGSM attack on MNIST, CIFAR10 respectively.
Attack MNIST CIFAR10
C APE-
GANm
DenseNet40 APE-
GANc
 = 0.1 35.9 0.8 77.8 26.4
 = 0.2 86.0 1.1 84.7 45.2
 = 0.3 96.3 2.8 86.3 55.9
 = 0.4 98.0 21.0 87.2 63.4
JSMA attacks, the model is provided by cleverhans
(denoted C in the Appendix). The 0.9%, 0.5% and
0.8% error rates can be achieved by the models A,
B and C on clean images respectively, comparable to
the state of the art.
• CIFAR10: ResNet18[7] is trained by us for L-BFGS
and DeepFool attack. For CW attack, the model is
provided by Carlini (denoted D in the Appendix).
For FGSM and JSMA attacks, DenseNet[8] with
depth=40 is trained. The 7.1%, 20.2%∗ and 9.9%
error rates can be achieved by the models ResNet18,
D and DenseNet40 on clean images respectively.
∗It is noteworthy that the 20.2% error rate of target model D is signif-
icantly greater than the other models, however, identical to the error rate
reported by Carlini[2]. For accurate comparison, we respect the choice
of author.
Table 4: Error rates (in %) of adversarial exmamples gen-
erated from FGSM with different  for target model Incep-
tionV3, APE-GANi on ImageNet. The error rate of target
model on the clean images is reported in the experimental
setup.
Attack ImageNet(Top 1) ImageNet(Top 5)
InceptionV3 APE-
GANi
InceptionV3 APE-
GANi
 = 4 / 255 72.2 38.0 41.7 21.0
 = 8 / 255 72.9 40.1 42.3 22.5
 = 12 / 255 73.4 41.2 43.4 22.9
 = 16 / 255 74.8 42.4 44.0 23.6
• ImageNet: We use ResNet50 one pre-trained net-
works for L-BFGS and DeepFool attacks. For other
three attacks, another pre-trained network Incep-
tionV3 is leveraged [25]. ResNet50 achieves the top-
1 error rate 24.4% and the top-5 error rate 7.2% while
InceptionV3 achieves the top-1 error rate 22.9% and
the top-5 error rate 6.1% on clean images.
4.1.3 APE-GAN
Three models are trained with the APE-GAN architec-
ture on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet(denoted APE-
GANm, APE-GANc, APE-GANi in the Appendix). The
full training set of MNIST and CIFAR10 are utilized for
the training of APE-GANm and APE-GANc respectively
while a random sample of 50,000 RGB inputs from the
training set of ImageNet make a contribution to train the
APE-GANi.
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• MNIST: APE-GANm is trained for 2 epochs on
batches of 64 FGSM samples with  = 0.3, input size
= (28,28,1).
• CIFAR10: APE-GANc is trained for 10 epochs on
batches of 64 FGSM samples with  = 0.1, input size
= (32,32,3).
• ImageNet: APE-GANi is trained for 30 epochs on
batches of 16 FGSM samples with  = 8 / 255, in-
put size = (256,256,3). However, as we all know, the
input size of ResNet50 is 224 * 224 and the Incep-
tionV3 is 299 * 299. So we use the resize operation
to handle this.
The straightforward method to train the generator and
the discriminator is update both in every batch. However,
the discriminator network often learns much faster than
the generator network because the generator is more com-
plex than distinguishing between real samples and fake
samples. Therefore, generator should be run twice with
each iteration to make sure that the loss of discriminator
does not go to zero. The learning rate is initialized with
0.0002 and Adam[9] optimizer is used to update param-
eters and optimize the networks. The weights of the ad-
versarial perturbation elimination specified loss ξ1 and ξ2
used in the Eqn.12 are fixed to 0.7 and 0.3 separately.
The training procedure of the APE-GAN needs no
knowledge of the architecture and parameters of the target
model.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Effectiveness:
• Adversarial Input Table 1 indicates that the error
rates of adversarial inputs are significantly decreased
after its perturbation is eliminated by APE-GAN.
Among all the attacks, the CW attack is more of-
fensive than the others, and among the three attacks
of CW, the CW-L0 is more offensive. The error rate
of FGSM is greater than the L-BFGS which may be
caused by different target models. As it is shown
in Figure 3, the aggressivity of adversarial examples
can be eliminated by APE-GAN even though these
is imperceptible differences between (a) and (b). In
addition, the adversarial examples generated from
(a) (b)
Figure 3: ImageNet dataset (a) Adversarial samples
crafted by FGSM with  = 8 / 255 on the ImageNet (b)
Reconstructed samples by APE-GAN
FGSM with different  are resisted and the result is
shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
• Benign Input The error rate of clean images and
the clean images added with random Gaussian noise
is shown in Table 2. Actual details within the im-
age can be lost with multiple levels of convolutional
and down-sampling layers which has a negative ef-
fect on the classification. However, Table 2 indicates
that there is no marked increase in the error rate of
clean images. Meanwhile, APE-GAN has a good
performance on resisting the random noise. Figure 4
shows that the perturbation generated from random
Gaussian noise is irregular and all in a muddle while
the perturbation obtained from the FGSM attack is
regular and intentional. However the perturbation,
whether regular or irregular, can be eliminated by
APE-GAN.
In summary, APE-GAN has the capability to provide a
good performance to various input, whether adversarial or
benign, on three benchmark datasets.
4.2.2 Strong Applicability:
The experimental setup of target models indicates that
there is more than one target model designed in experi-
ments on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet respectively.
Table 1 demonstrates that APE-GAN can tackle adversar-
ial examples for different target models. Actually, it can
9
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: MNIST dataset (a). clean image (b). random
Gaussian noise image (c). adversarial samples obtained
from FGSM with  = 0.3 (d). reconstructed image of (a)
by APE-GAN (e). reconstructed image of (b) by APE-
GAN (f). reconstructed samples of (c) by APE-GAN
provide a defense without knowing what model they are
constructed upon. Therefore, we can conclude that the
APE-GAN possesses strong applicability.
5 Discussion and Future Work
Pre-processing the input to eliminate the adversarial per-
turbations is another appealing aspect of the framework
which makes sure there is no conflict between the frame-
work and other existing defenses. Then APE-GAN can
work with other defenses such as adversarial train-
ing together. Another method APE-GAN followed by
a target model trained using adversarial training is exper-
imented. The results on MNIST and CIFAR10 have been
done shown in Table 7, 8, 9 in the Appendix. The ad-
versarial examples leveraged in Table 9 in the Appendix
are generated from Iterative Gradient Sign with N = 2.
Actually, the FGSM leveraged to craft the adversarial ex-
amples of Table 8 is identical to the Iterative Gradient
Sign with N = 1. Compared with Table 8, Table 9 indi-
cates that the robustness of target model cannot be signif-
icantly improved with adversarial training. However, the
combination of APE-GAN and adversarial training makes
a notable defence against Iterative Gradient Sign. New
combinations of different defenses will be researched in
the future work.
The core work in this paper is to propose a new per-
spective of defending against adversarial examples and to
first eliminate the adversarial perturbations using a trained
network and then feed the processed example to classifi-
cation networks. The training of this adversarial perturba-
tion elimination network is based on the Generative Ad-
versarial Nets framework. Experimental results on three
benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach.
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Table 5: Conv1: convolutional layer with stride = 1. Conv2: convolutional layer with stride = 2. FC: fully
connected layer. Model A,B,C are leveraged for MNIST and model D for CIFAR10.
A B C D
Conv1(32,3,3) + Relu Conv1(32,3,3) + Relu Conv2(64,8,8) + Relu Conv1(64,3,3) + Relu
Conv1(64,3,3) + Relu Conv1(32,3,3) + Relu Conv2(128,6,6) + Relu Conv1(64,3,3) + Relu
Max Pooling Max Pooling Conv1(128,5,5) + Relu Max Pooling
Dropout(0.25) Conv1(64,3,3) + Relu FC(10) + Softmax Conv1(128,3,3) + Relu
FC(128) + Relu Conv1(64,3,3) + Relu Conv1(128,3,3) + Relu
Dropout(0.5) Max Pooling Max Pooling
FC(10) + Softmax FC(200) + Relu FC(256) + Relu
FC(200) + Relu FC(256) + Relu
FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
Table 6: The following three models are trained based on the AE-GAN framework on MNIST, CIFAR10
and ImageNet. Conv: convolutional layer with stride = 2. Deconv: conv2d transpose layer with stride
= 2. FC: fully connected layer. BN: Batch Normalization. C: channel numbers of the input. The input
of generator is an image not the vector Z which is the major difference from original GAN. The model
APE-GANm has no difference from APE-GANc except for the input size and the channel numbers.
APE-GANm , APE-GANc APE-GANi
generator discriminator generator discriminator
Conv(64,3,3) Conv(64,3,3) + lrelu Conv(64,3,3) Conv(64,3,3)
BN + lrelu Conv(128,3,3) BN + lrelu BN + lrelu
Conv(128,3,3) BN + lrelu Conv(128,3,3) Conv(128,3,3)
BN + lrelu Conv(256,3,3) BN + lrelu BN + lrelu
Deconv(64) BN + lrelu Conv(256,3,3) Conv(256,3,3)
BN + lrelu FC(1) + Sigmoid BN + lrelu BN + lrelu
Deconv(C) Deconv(256) Conv(256,3,3)
Sigmoid BN + lrelu BN + lrelu
Deconv(128) FC(1024)
BN + lrelu BN + lrelu
Deconv(C) FC(1) + Sigmoid
Sigmoid
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Table 7: Error rates (in %) of adversarial exmamples generated from five attack methods for target model, AE-GAN,
adversarial training and AE-GAN + adversarial training on MNIST and CIFAR10. The error rates of target models
on the clean images are reported in the experimental setup. The error rates of adversarial examples generated from
L-BFGS(based on the target model ResNet18), DeepFool(based on the target model ResNet18) and CW (based on the
target model D) are 10.7%, 12.5%, 11.8% on CIFAR10 respectively. It illustrates that the transferability doesn’t work
when we utilize the adversarial exmamples generated from model ResNet18, D to attck model Desnet40. Then the error
rates of adversarial training and AE-GAN + adversarial training are filled with default values.
Attack MNIST CIFAR10
Target
Model
AE −
GANm
Adversarial
Training
AE −
GANm +
adversarial
training
Target
Model
AE −
GANc
Adversarial
Training
AE −
GANc +
adversarial
training
L-BFGS 93.4 2.2 2.6 2.0 92.7 19.0 - -
FGSM 96.3 2.8 6.6 2.6 77.8 26.4 12.2 23.7
DeepFool 97.1 2.2 3.7 2.1 98.3 19.2 - -
JSMA 97.8 38.6 33.6 21.0 94.1 38.3 55.3 32.3
CW-L0 100.0 27.0 15.5 9.5 100.0 46.9 - -
CW-L2 100.0 1.5 2.5 1.1 100.0 30.5 - -
CW-L∞ 100.0 1.2 0.7 0.5 100.0 32.2 - -
Table 8: Error rates (in %) of adversarial exmamples generated from FGSM with different  for target model, AE-GAN,
adversarial training and AE-GAN + adversarial training on MNIST and CIFAR10. The error rates of target models on
the clean images are reported in the experimental setup. Here, the target models used for FGSM attack are also leveraged
as the base models for adversarial training.
Attack MNIST CIFAR10
Target
Model
AE −
GANm
Adversarial
Training
AE −
GANm +
adversarial
training
Target
Model
AE −
GANc
Adversarial
Training
AE −
GANc +
adversarial
training
 = 0.1 35.9 0.8 1.6 0.6 77.8 26.4 12.2 23.7
 = 0.2 86.0 1.1 3.4 1.0 84.7 45.2 39.6 36.4
 = 0.3 96.3 2.8 6.6 2.6 86.3 55.9 73.7 53.7
 = 0.4 98.0 21.0 59.8 17.7 87.2 63.4 81.7 63.2
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Table 9: Error rates (in %) of adversarial exmamples generated from Iterative
Gradient Sign with N = 2 and different α for adversarial training and AE-GAN
+ adversarial training on MNIST and CIFAR10. Here, the target models are
used for Iterative Gradient Sign attack which are identical to the target models
for FGSM attack.
Attack MNIST CIFAR10
Adversarial
Training
AE−GANm
+ adversarial
training
Adversarial
Training
AE −GANc
+ adversarial
training
α = 0.1 32.0 1.9 72.6 26.5
α = 0.2 82.5 2.5 82.5 38.3
α = 0.3 84.7 4.5 86.5 51.7
α = 0.4 94.5 22.3 88.0 71.0
(a) adversarial samples obtained from FGSM with  = 8 / 255 (b) reconstructed image by APE-GAN
Figure 5: ImageNet dataset
.
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